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OPINION OF THE COURT 
____________________ 
 
 
ALITO, Circuit Judge: 
 This is an appeal from an order granting summary judgment in 
favor of the defendants in an action brought by the Secretary of 
Labor ("the Secretary") to redress alleged violations of the 
Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974 ("ERISA"), 29 
U.S.C. §§ 1001-1461.  The action was based on certain financial 
transactions involving the International Brotherhood of 
Electrical Workers Union No. 98 Pension Plan ("the Plan") and the 
Electrical Mechanics Association ("EMA"), a not-for-profit 
corporation closely related to Local 98 of the International 
Brotherhood of Electrical Workers ("Local 98" or "the union"), 
whose members are covered by Plan.  Maintaining that these 
transactions were prohibited because of EMA's close relationship 
with Local 98, the Secretary sued the Plan trustees, Local 98, 
and EMA.  The district court granted summary judgment for the 
defendants, but we now reverse in part, affirm in part, and 
remand for further proceedings. 
 
 I. 
 In 1972, the Plan made a 30-year loan of $800,000 to EMA at 
7.5% interest.  EMA used this loan to finance construction of a 
building, and the loan was secured by a mortgage on this 
property.  The building constructed with the loan housed Local 
  
98's offices.  Two years after EMA obtained the loan, Congress 
passed ERISA.  Section 406(a) of ERISA, 29 U.S.C. § 1106(a), 
prohibits various transactions involving a plan and a "party in 
interest."  With respect to transactions that occurred before 
1974, however, these prohibitions did not take effect until June 
30, 1984.  See 29 U.S.C. § 1114(c). 
 Concerned that its outstanding loan to EMA would be 
considered a prohibited transaction after that date, the Plan 
applied to the Department of Labor on April 30, 1984 for an 
exemption from this provision.  See 29 U.S.C. § 1108 (authorizing 
the Secretary to grant exemptions from ERISA's prohibited 
transaction provisions).  On June 1, 1984, the Department 
tentatively denied the exemption and advised the Plan that its 
only permissible options were to renegotiate the terms of the 
loan so that EMA was charged a market interest rate or to require 
EMA to satisfy the loan in full.  Contrary to the advice of its 
counsel, the Plan withdrew its exemption request and, on April 
25, 1985, accepted from EMA a payment of $380,289.93, the fair 
market value of the loan, in full satisfaction of the debt, which 
at the time had an accounting value of $653,817.47.1  EMA 
borrowed the entire amount of this payment from Local 98.  Local 
98 then imposed a special "rental" assessment on its members and 
paid the proceeds to EMA.  EMA in turn used those funds to repay 
the money advanced by the union.  Joint Appendix ("JA") at 133. 
                     
1
.  The difference in value was due to the extraordinary increase 
in interest rates between 1972 and 1984. 
  
 During 1984 and 1985, Fred Compton, Joseph McHugh, and John 
Nielsen were Local 98's designated trustees ("union trustees") 
for the Plan; Frederick Hammerschmidt and Gersil Kay were the 
employer-designated trustees ("employer trustees"); and Fidelity-
Philadelphia Trust Company ("Fidelity") was the Plan's corporate 
trustee.  Compton was also president of both EMA and Local 98 
from 1981 through 1987; McHugh was a member of Local 98's 
executive board from 1981 through 1987; and Nielsen was financial 
secretary of Local 98 from 1981 through 1987, as well as a member 
of EMA's board of directors from 1981 through June 1984.   
 In October 1988, the Secretary filed a complaint in district 
court against Compton, McHugh, Nielsen, Hammerschmidt, Kay, 
Fidelity, EMA, and Local 98 (collectively "the defendants").  The 
complaint first asserted that EMA "was a shell corporation wholly 
controlled by Local 98" and that therefore "all transactions with 
EMA, were, in fact, transactions with Local 98," which was a 
"party in interest" under section 3(14)(D) of ERISA, 29 U.S.C. § 
1002(14)(D).2  JA at 17-18.  The complaint alleged that the loan 
to EMA became a prohibited transaction as of July 1, 1984, 
pursuant to sections 406(a)(1)(A), (B), and (D) of ERISA, 29 
U.S.C. §§ 1106(a)(1)(A), (B), and (D).3 Id. at 18.  Likewise, the 
complaint alleged that EMA's subsequent purchase of its note was 
                     
2
.  Section 3(14) of ERISA, 29 U.S.C. § 1002(14), is set out in 
the text infra at pages 15 to 16.  The Secretary conceded that 
EMA was not a party in interest. 
3
.  Section 406(a)(1) of ERISA, 29 U.S.C. § 1106(a)(1), is set 
out in the text, infra at page 12. 
  
a prohibited transaction under these same provisions because the 
note was purchased for less than its principal value.  Id. at 21. 
 Based on these transactions, the complaint claimed that 
various defendants had committed several different ERISA 
violations.  First, the complaint claimed that from July 1, 1984 
until August 25, 1984 (the date when EMA purchased the note), 
trustees Compton, McHugh, Nielsen, Hammerschmidt, and Kay had 
breached their fiduciary obligations under sections 404(a)(1)(A) 
and (B) of ERISA, 29 U.S.C. §§ 1104(a)(1)(A) and (B),4 by failing 
to collect on the loan.  Id. at 19.  Second, the complaint 
claimed that Fidelity had likewise breached its fiduciary duties 
under sections 404(a)(1)(A), (B), and (D) of ERISA, 29 U.S.C. §§ 
1104(a)(1)(A), (B), and (D), by failing to take appropriate 
action to collect on the loan during this same period.  Id. at 
20.  Third, the complaint alleged that all Plan trustees had 
breached their fiduciary obligations by causing the Plan to 
continue to hold the EMA loan during this same period even though 
they knew or should have known that doing so constituted a 
prohibited transaction under sections 406(a)(1)(B) and (D) of 
ERISA, 29 U.S.C. §§ 1106(a)(1)(B) and (D).  Id. at 20-21.  
Fourth, the complaint charged that all the Plan trustees had 
breached their fiduciary obligations by causing the Plan to sell 
the note to EMA when they knew or should have known that this was 
a prohibited transaction under sections 406(a)(1)(A) and (D) of 
                     
4
.  Section 404(a)(1) of ERISA, 29 U.S.C. § 1104(a)(1), is set 
out in the text, infra at page 50.   
  
ERISA, 29 U.S.C. §§ 1106(a)(1)(A) and (D).  Id. at 21.  Fifth, 
the complaint alleged that the union trustees had breached their 
duties to the Plan under sections 406(b)(1) and (2) of ERISA, 29 
U.S.C. §§ 1106(b)(1) and (2)5, by "dealing with the assets of the 
Plan in their own interest and for their own accounts, and in 
their individual capacity by acting in a transaction involving 
the Plan on behalf of a party (or representing a party) whose 
interests were adverse to those of the Plan" and its participants 
or beneficiaries.  Id. 21.  Finally, the complaint alleged that 
EMA and Local 98 had participated in the trustees' breaches of 
their fiduciary duties and, furthermore, that each Plan trustee 
was liable for the others' fiduciary breaches under sections 
405(a)(2) and (3) and (b)(1)(A) of ERISA, 29 U.S.C. §§ 1105(a)(2) 
and (3) and (b)(1)(A).6  Id. at 21-22. 
                     
5
.  Section 406(b)(2) of ERISA, 29 U.S.C. § 1106(b)(2), is set 
out in the text, infra at page 43. 
6
.  Sections 405(a)(2) and (3) of ERISA, 29 U.S.C. §§ 1105(a)(2) 
and (3), provide: 
 
  (a) In addition to any liability which he may have 
under any other provision of this part, a fiduciary 
with respect to a plan shall be liable for a breach of 
fiduciary responsibility of another fiduciary with 
respect to the same plan in the following 
circumstances: . . . 
 
   (2) if, by his failure to comply with section 
1104(a)(1) of this title in the administration of 
his specific responsibilities which give rise to 
his status as a fiduciary, he had enabled such 
other fiduciary to commit a breach; or 
 
   (3) if he has knowledge of a breach by such 
other fiduciary, unless he makes reasonable 
efforts under the circumstances to remedy the 
breach. 
  
 The complaint sought an injunction prohibiting the defendants 
from committing further ERISA violations.  Id. at 23.  It also 
sought an order requiring Local 98 and EMA to "restor[e] to the 
Plan the unpaid balance of the loan with interest" and an order 
requiring each defendant, jointly and severally, "to restore to 
the Plan all Plan losses attributable to their fiduciary 
breaches."  Id. at 23-24. 
 After discovery, the Secretary moved for summary judgment.  
Much of the Secretary's argument rested on the contention that 
EMA was "a shell corporation or alter ego wholly controlled by 
Local 98."  Id. at 147.  The district court initially denied this 
motion in February 1993, but following the Supreme Court's 
decision in Mertens v. Hewitt Associates, 113 S. Ct. 2063 (1993), 
the district court requested the parties to submit briefs 
concerning the impact of that decision.  The court subsequently 
vacated its earlier order denying the Secretary's motion for 
summary judgment and instead entered summary judgment in favor of 
the non-moving defendants.  McLaughlin v. Compton, 834 F. Supp. 
743, 751 (E.D. Pa. 1993) ("Compton I").  The court interpreted 
Mertens as a directive to "strictly construe" ERISA.  Id. at 747.  
(..continued) 
 
Section 405(b)(1)(A) of ERISA, 29 U.S.C. § 1105(b)(1)(A), 
provides: 
 
  Except as otherwise provided in subsection (d) of 
this section and in section 1103(a)(1) and (2) of this 
title, if the assets of a plan are held by two or more 
trustees -- 
 
   (A) each shall use reasonable care to prevent a 
co-trustee from committing a breach . . . . 
  
Noting that EMA was not "a party in interest" under the 
applicable provision of ERISA, the district court reasoned that 
the Secretary's alter ego argument would expand the reach of this 
provision and thus contravene Mertens' teaching that liability 
can be imposed under ERISA only when the statute "explicitly 
prohibits the challenged transaction . . . ."   Id. 
 The Secretary moved for reconsideration, arguing that "the 
literal text of ERISA" prohibited the transactions at issue in 
this case.  JA at 343.  Specifically, the Secretary contended 
that the challenged transactions constituted "indirect" 
transactions with Local 98, in violation of sections 
406(a)(1)(A), (B), and (D) of ERISA, and that the transactions 
constituted the "use" of Plan assets "for the benefit" of Local 
98, in violation of section 406(a)(1)(D) of ERISA.  Id. at 348-
49.  In addition, the Secretary argued that, even if the court 
adhered to its previous ruling that the loan to EMA and its 
subsequent purchase were not prohibited transactions, the court 
would still have to decide:  (a) whether all of the trustees had 
breached their fiduciary duties under section 404(a) of ERISA and 
(b) whether the union trustees had breached their fiduciary 
duties and violated sections 406(b)(1) and (2) of ERISA, as 
interpreted in Cutaiar v. Marshall, 590 F.2d 523 (3d Cir. 1979), 
when, in connection with EMA's purchase of the note for less than 
its accounting value, they allegedly "acted on both sides of the 
transaction in their joint capacities as Plan trustees, union 
officers, and EMA governing board members . . . ."   Id. at 349-
50. 
  
 The district court denied this motion.  After observing that 
"it would be appropriate to deny the motion on purely procedural 
grounds" because it simply advanced additional arguments not 
raised in the Secretary's prior brief concerning Mertens, the 
court addressed the merits of the Secretary's argument.  Reich v. 
Compton, 834 F. Supp. 753, 755-56 (E.D. Pa. 1993) ("Compton II").  
Interpreting the Secretary's motion as arguing that the 
transactions in question were "indirect party in interest 
transactions," the court wrote that "ERISA does not contemplate 
transfers to `indirect parties in interest'--the transferee is 
either a party in interest under the statute or it is not."  Id. 
at 756.  The court also concluded that the transactions did not 
constitute a "direct" benefit to the union because "[n]o cash 
`benefits' or `plan assets' ever passed to Local 98."   Id.  
Likewise, the court held that the questioned transactions did not 
constitute an "indirect benefit" to Local 98 because it paid rent 
to occupy the building constructed with the loan and because the 
union had no obligation to finance EMA's purchase of the note.  
Id.  
 Finally, the court rejected the argument that the union 
trustees violated sections 406(b)(1) and (2) of ERISA due to 
their participation in EMA's purchase of the note.  Attempting to 
distinguish Cutaiar, supra, the court observed that "the boards 
of the Plan and EMA were not identical" and that the union 
trustees did not constitute a majority of or control EMA's board.  
Compton II, 834 F. Supp. at 757.  The district court did not, 
however, address the Secretary's argument that the Plan trustees 
  
had violated their fiduciary duties pursuant to section 404(a) of 
ERISA.  This appeal followed. 
 
II.  ERISA Section 406(a)(1) Claims Against Fiduciaries 
   A.  We first address whether the district court correctly 
entered summary judgment against the Secretary with respect to 
his claims that the Plan trustees violated sections 406(a)(1)(A), 
(B), and (D) of ERISA, 29 U.S.C. §§ 1106(a)(1)(A), (B), and (D).  
Congress adopted section 406(a) of ERISA to prevent plans from 
engaging in certain types of transactions that had been used in 
the past to benefit other parties at the expense of the plans' 
participants and beneficiaries.  Before ERISA, plans could 
generally engage in transactions with related parties so long as 
the transactions were "arms-length."  Commissioner of Internal 
Revenue v. Keystone Consolidated Indus., 113 S. Ct. 2006, 2012 
(1993).  Unfortunately, this rule was difficult to police and 
thus "provided an open door for abuses" by plan trustees. Id.   
 Congress accordingly enacted section 406(a) with the goal of 
creating a categorical bar to certain types of transactions that 
were regarded as likely to injure a plan.  Id.; S. Rep. No. 93-
383, 93rd Cong., 2d Sess. (1974), reprinted in 1974 U.S.C.C.A.N. 
4890, 4981.  Section 406, which is entitled "Prohibited 
transactions," provides in pertinent part as follows: 
  (a) Transactions between a plan and a party in 
interest 
 
Except as provided in section 1108 of this title: 
 
  (1)  A fiduciary with respect to a plan shall not 
cause the plan to engage in a transaction, if he knows 
  
or should know that such transaction constitutes a 
direct or indirect-- 
 
   (A) sale or exchange, or leasing, of any 
property between the plan and a party in interest; 
 
     (B) lending of money or other extension of 
credit between the plan and a party in interest; 
    
   (C) furnishing of goods, services, or facilities 
between the plan and a party in interest; 
 
     (D) transfer to, or use by or for the benefit of 
a party in interest, of any assets of the plan . . 
. . 
 
 In considering the Secretary's section 406(a)(1) claims 
against the Plan trustees, we will separate our inquiry into two 
parts.  First, in part II.B. of this opinion, we will consider 
whether the transactions at issue in this case may be prohibited 
"indirect" transactions between the Plan and a "party in 
interest" (i.e., Local 98), in violation of section 406(a)(1)(A), 
(B), and (D).  Second, we will consider, in part II.C. of this 
opinion, whether these transactions may constitute the use of 
Plan assets "for the benefit" of Local 98, in contravention of 
section 406(a)(1)(D).7 
 B.  "Indirect" Transactions.  Subsections (A), (B), and (D) 
of section 406(a)(1) of ERISA all reach certain direct and 
indirect transactions between a plan and a party in interest.  
Subsection (A) applies to the sale, exchange, or lease of 
                     
7
.  It is questionable whether the Secretary adequately raised 
this argument in district court prior to his motion for 
reconsideration, but since the district court denied the 
Secretary's motion for reconsideration on the merits, we also 
reach the merits of this argument. 
  
property between a plan and a party in interest.  Subsection (B) 
applies to the lending of money or other extension of credit 
between a plan and a party in interest.  And subsection (D) 
reaches, among other transactions, the transfer of plan assets to 
a party in interest.  In this case, the Secretary argues that the 
Plan's loan to EMA and its subsequent sale of the underlying note 
to EMA were indirect transactions with Local 98 that violated 
these provisions.8  The Secretary argues that indirect 
transactions within the meaning of section 406(a)(1) include the 
following three categories: 
(1) multi-party transactions from a plan through one or 
more third-party intermediaries to a party in interest; 
(2) two-party transactions that are more complex than a 
simple sale, loan, or transfer of assets; and (3) 
transactions between a plan and the alter ego of a 
party in interest . . . . 
 
Dept. of Labor 9/13/94 Letter-Brief at 2.9  The Secretary admits 
that the first two types of transactions are not involved here.10  
                     
8
.  Specifically, the Secretary asserts that the transactions 
constituted either an "indirect . . . sale or exchange . . . 
between a plan and a party in interest," in violation of section 
406(a)(1)(A); an "indirect . . . lending of money between the 
plan and a party in interest," in violation of section 
406(a)(1)(B), or an "indirect . . . transfer [of plan assets] to 
. . . a party in interest," in violation of section 406(a)(1)(D). 
9
.  While the Secretary does not assert that this list is 
exhaustive, we limit our consideration in this appeal to the 
three categories that the Secretary has mentioned. 
10
.  According to the Secretary, an example of the first type of 
transaction prohibited by section 406(a)(1) is a case in which a 
third party obtains a loan from a plan and then immediately turns 
over those funds to a party in interest.  As an example of the 
second type of transaction prohibited by section 406(a)(1), the 
Secretary points to Keystone Consolidated Indus., 113 S. Ct. at 
2013 (1993).  There a party in interest transferred property to 
the plan in satisfaction of its funding obligations.  According 
  
Thus, the question before us is whether, as the Secretary 
contends, a transaction between a plan and an alter ego of a 
party in interest is, necessarily, an indirect transaction 
between the plan and a party in interest. 
 In advancing this argument, the Secretary begins by 
maintaining that his interpretation of section 406(a)(1) is 
entitled to deference under the principles set out in Chevron 
U.S.A., Inc. v. National Resources Defense Council, Inc., 467 
U.S. 837, 843-44 (1984).11  We hold, however, that the 
Secretary's alter ego argument is inconsistent with clear 
congressional intent, and we therefore refuse to accept it.  See 
Brown v. Gardner, 115 S. Ct. 552, 556 (1994); Dole v. 
Steelworkers, 494 U.S. 26, 42-43 (1990). 
 The categorical prohibitions contained in section 406(a)(1) 
are built upon the concept of a "party in interest," and section 
3(14) of ERISA, 29 U.S.C. § 1002(14), provides a long and 
detailed definition of this concept.  Section 3(14) states: 
  The term "party in interest" means, as to an employee 
benefit plan-- 
(..continued) 
to the Secretary, this type of transaction can be conceptualized 
as a contribution of cash to the plan followed by the plan's 
purchase of the property with that cash.  We agree with the 
Secretary that neither of these two types of transactions is at 
issue here. 
11
.  The Secretary's alter ego argument, however, does not appear 
to be embodied in any regulation or enforcement guideline.  
Moreover, it is not clear that the Secretary advanced this 
interpretation in any prior litigation.  In light of our 
conclusion that the alter ego theory is inconsistent with the 
relevant provisions of ERISA, we need not determine the degree of 
deference, if any, that would otherwise be warranted under these 
circumstances.  See Martin v. OSHRC, 499 U.S. 144, 156-57 (1991). 
  
 
   (A) any fiduciary (including, but not limited 
to, any administrator, officer, trustee, or 
custodian), counsel, or employee of such employee 
benefit plan; 
 
   (B) a person providing services to such plan; 
 
   (C) an employer any of whose employees are 
covered by such plan; 
 
   (D) an employee organization any of whose 
members are covered by such plan; 
 
   (E) an owner, direct or indirect, of 50 percent 
or more of-- 
 
    (i) the combined voting power of all 
classes of stock entitled to vote or the 
total value of shares of all classes of stock 
of a corporation, 
 
    (ii) the capital interest or the profits 
interest of a partnership, or 
 
    (iii) the beneficial interest of a trust or 
unincorporated enterprise, which is an 
employer or an employee organization 
described in subparagraph (C) or (D); 
 
   (F) a relative (as defined in paragraph (15) of 
any individual described in subparagraph (A), (B), 
(C), or (E); 
 
   (G) a corporation, partnership, or trust or 
estate of which (or in which) 50 percent or more 
of -- 
 
    (i) the combined voting power of classes of 
stock entitled to vote or the total value of 
shares of all classes of stock of such 
corporation, 
 
    (ii) the capital interest or profits 
interest of such partnership, or 
 
    (iii) the beneficial interest of such trust 
or estate,  
 
  
 is owned directly or indirectly, or held by 
persons described in subparagraph (A), (B), (C), 
(D), or (E); 
 
   (H)  an employee, officer, director (or 
individual having powers or responsibilities 
similar to those of officers or directors), or a 
10 percent or more shareholder directly or 
indirectly, of a person described in subparagraph 
(B), (C), (D), (E), or (G), or of the employee 
benefit plan; or 
 
   (I)  a 10 percent or more (directly or directly 
in capital or profits) partner joint venturer of a 
person described in subparagraph (B), (C), (D), 
(E), or (G). 
 
The Secretary, after consultation and coordination with 
the Secretary of Treasury, may by regulation prescribe 
a percentage lower than 50 percent for subparagraph (E) 
and (G) and lower than 10 percent for subparagraph (H) 
or (I).  The Secretary my prescribe regulations for 
determining the ownership (direct or indirect) of 
profits and beneficial interests, and the manner in 
which indirect stockholdings are taken into account.  
Any person who is a party in interest with respect to a 
plan to which a trust described in section 501(c)(22) 
of Title 26 is permitted to make payments under section 
1403 of this title shall be treated as a party in 
interest with respect to such trust. 
 
 The Secretary's interpretation would in effect add an 
additional category, i.e., an alter ego of a party in interest, 
to this seemingly comprehensive list.  Moreover, this additional 
category would substantially overlap some of the categories 
specifically listed in this provision.  See, e.g., 29 U.S.C. §§ 
1002(14) (E) and (G).  We therefore agree with the district court 
that the Secretary's interpretation would upset the carefully 
crafted and detailed legislative scheme reflected in section 
3(14).  See Compton I, 834 F. Supp. at 746-47, 49.  See also 
Mertens, 113 S. Ct. at 2067; Massachusetts Mutual Life Ins. Co. 
  
v. Russell, 473 U.S. 134, 146-47 (1988).  Congress could have 
easily provided in section 3(14) that an "alter ego" of a party 
in interest is also a party in interest, but Congress did not do 
so.  See Joslyn Mfg. Co. v. T.L. James & Co., 893 F.2d 80, 83 
(5th Cir. 1990), cert. denied, 498 U.S. 1108 (1991).  As the 
Supreme Court stated in Mertens, 113 S. Ct. at 2071-72, ERISA is 
"an enormously detailed statute that resolved innumerable 
disputes between powerful competing interests," and courts should 
not "attempt to adjust the balance . . . Congress has struck."   
 The Secretary's interpretation appears to rest on the false 
premise that there is a uniform body of law that can be employed 
in all contexts for the purpose of determining whether one entity 
or person is another's alter ego.12  In reality, however, the 
term alter ego is simply shorthand for the conclusion that one 
party should be held liable in a particular context for the 
transgressions of another closely related party.  Consequently, 
                     
12
.  Indeed, the Secretary cannot even claim that his 
interpretation is consistent with the common law of trusts upon 
which Congress engrafted ERISA.  See Firestone Tire and Rubber 
Co. v. Bruch, 489 U.S. 101, 110 (1989).  The Secretary can point 
to no body of trust law evidencing his proposed alter ego 
principles.  This is not surprising given that the alter ego 
doctrine originally developed in the context of corporate law.  
The common law of trusts did not include per se prohibitions 
against a trustee dealing with a related party, and certainly did 
not include per se prohibitions against a trustee dealing with an 
alter ego of a related party.  Instead, a trustee's sale of trust 
property to a related party could only be set aside if it were 
shown that the trustee was improperly influenced by the 
relationship and received an unfair price.  See Keystone 
Consolidated Indus., 113 S. Ct. at 2012; Restatement (Second) of 
Trust § 170 cmt. e (1957); 2A Austin W. Scott & William F. 
Fratcher, Law of Trusts § 170.6 (4th ed. 1987). 
  
the principles governing alter ego liability vary depending on 
the legal context in which the determination takes place.  For 
example, the factors supporting the imposition of alter ego 
liability in labor law differ from those employed in the 
corporate law setting.  Compare Stardyne, Inc. v. NLRB, 41 F.3d 
141, 151 (3d Cir. 1994) (explaining that, for the purposes of the 
National Labor Relations Act, factors relevant for determining 
whether two employers are alter egos include whether they share 
substantially identical management, business purpose, operation, 
equipment, customers, supervision, and ownership) with Culberth 
v. Amosa Ltd., 898 F.3d 13, 14 (3d Cir. 1990) (explaining that at 
common law two companies will be considered alter egos of one 
another only "where the controlling corporation wholly ignored 
the separate status of the controlled corporation and controlled 
its affairs [so] that its separate existence was a mere sham"); 
see also Berkey v. Third Ave. Ry., 155 N.E. 58, 61 (1927) 
("Dominion may be so complete, interference so obtrusive, that by 
the general rule of agency the parent will be a principal and the 
subsidiary an agent.  Where control is less than this, we are 
remitted to the tests of honesty and justice.").  Thus, if alter 
ego analysis were to be required under sections 3(14) and 
406(a)(1) of ERISA, the Secretary and the courts would have to 
decide, presumably based on their understanding of the "purpose" 
or "policy" underlying the relevant provisions of ERISA, under 
what circumstances a party related to a party in interest should 
be subjected to the same prohibitions as a party in interest.  
Congress itself, however, made this very determination when it 
  
adopted the definition of a party in interest that is set out in 
section 3(14).   
 For these reasons, we cannot accept the Secretary's alter ego 
argument, and we conclude that section 406(a)(1)'s prohibitions 
against certain indirect transactions between a plan and a party 
in interest do not automatically prohibit transactions between a 
plan and an alter ego of a party in interest.  We emphasize the 
narrowness of our holding.  While we reject the Secretary's alter 
ego argument, we do not reach any other possible interpretations 
of the concept of an "indirect" transaction with a party in 
interest. 
 C.  Use of Plan Assets for the Benefit of a Party in 
Interest.  In addition to prohibiting the transfer of plan assets 
to a party in interest, section 406(a)(1)(D) also provides as 
follows: 
A fiduciary with respect to a plan shall not cause the 
plan to engage in a transaction, if he knows or should 
know that such transaction constitutes . . . a direct 
or indirect . . . use . . . for the benefit of a party 
in interest, of any assets of the plan. 
 
29 U.S.C. § 1106(a)(1)(D) (emphasis added).  As we read this 
language, it provides that a fiduciary breach occurs when the 
following five elements are satisfied:  (1) the person or entity 
is "[a] fiduciary with respect to [the] plan"; (2) the fiduciary 
"cause[s]" the plan to engage in the transaction at issue; (3) 
the transaction "use[s]" plan assets; (4) the transaction's use 
of the assets is "for the benefit of" a party in interest; and 
  
(5) the fiduciary "knows or should know" that elements three and 
four are satisfied. 
 In this case, it is clear that summary judgment in favor of 
the defendants cannot be sustained based on elements one, two, or 
three.  With respect to the first element, it is undisputed that 
defendants Compton, McHugh, Nielsen, Hammerschmidt, and Kay were 
"fiduciaries," and we think it is clear, as the district court 
held, that Fidelity was a "fiduciary" as well.13  As for element 
                     
13
.  Section 3(21)(A) of ERISA, 29 U.S.C. § 1002(21)(A), provides 
that, subject to an exception that is not applicable here:   
 
[A] person is a fiduciary with respect to a plan to the 
extent (i) he exercises any discretionary control 
respecting management of such plan or exercises any 
authority or control respecting management or 
disposition of its assets, (ii) he renders investment 
advice for a fee or other compensation, direct or 
indirect, with respect to any moneys or property of 
such plan, or has authority or responsibility to do so, 
or (iii) he has any discretionary authority or 
discretionary responsibility in the administration of 
such plan. . . . 
 
 Fidelity claims that it was not a fiduciary because it 
had no discretionary authority over the Plan's assets and was 
only a "depository" for the mortgage note.  However, Fidelity 
clearly had, at the least, "authority respecting the management" 
of the Plan's assets.  The 1980 Amendment to the Plan's trust 
agreement granted Fidelity "exclusive authority and discretion in 
the investment of the Fund . . . ."  JA at 342.  The minutes from 
the meetings of the Plan's Board of Trustees reveal that Fidelity 
had control over the Plan's investments.  Id. at 55, 63, 83, 92-
93.  Likewise, Fidelity's involvement in the sale of the note to 
EMA clearly indicates that it "render[ed] investment advice" to 
the Plan.  Fidelity concedes that its chief investment officer 
initially advised the Plan trustees that the sale of this asset 
would be "imprudent." Id. at 83.  Thus, we agree with the 
district court and conclude that Fidelity was a fiduciary with 
respect to the Plan.  Compton I, 834 F. Supp. at 751 n.7.  See 
Lowen v. Tower Asset Management, Inc., 829 F.2d 1209, 1219 (2d 
Cir. 1987) (finding discretionary investment manager to be an 
ERISA fiduciary).    
  
two, if the summary judgment record does not establish that the 
defendants "cause[d]" the Plan to engage in the challenged 
transaction, the record surely does not require the contrary 
conclusion.  And with respect to element three, there can be no 
reasonable dispute that the transactions involved the "use" of 
Plan assets.  The critical elements for present purposes are 
therefore elements four and five. 
 Element four, as previously noted, requires that the 
challenged transaction must constitute the use of plan assets 
"for the benefit of" a party in interest.  The defendants contend 
that this element requires proof of a subjective intent to 
benefit a party in interest, whereas the Secretary maintains that 
such subjective intent is not necessary.  Rather, the Secretary 
argues, all that need be proven is that the fiduciary should have 
known that the transaction would result in a benefit to a party 
in interest that was more than "minimal, incidental, or 
fortuitous."  Dept. of Labor 9/13/94 Letter-Brief at 12. 
 We conclude that element four requires proof of a subjective 
intent to benefit a party in interest.  This interpretation is 
strongly supported, if not required, by the statutory phrase "for 
the benefit."  In ordinary usage, if something is done "for the 
benefit of" x, it is done for the purpose of benefitting x.  If 
something is not done for the purpose of benefitting x but has 
that unintended effect, it cannot be said that it was done "for 
the benefit of" x.  (It would be self-contradictory if someone 
said:  "I did that for the benefit of x, but I did not want to 
benefit him."). 
  
 In addition, if element four did not require a subjective 
intent to benefit a party in interest, section 406(a)(1)(D) would 
produce unreasonable consequences that we feel confident Congress 
could not have wanted.  See Commissioner v. Brown, 380 U.S. 563, 
571 (1965).  If "for the benefit of" is read to mean "having the 
effect of benefitting," section 406(a)(1)(D) would appear to 
prohibit a fiduciary from causing a plan to engage in any 
transaction that he or she should know would result in any form 
or degree of benefit for any party in interest, even if the 
transaction would be highly advantageous for the plan and the 
benefit for the party in interest would be unintended, indirect, 
and slight. 
 Apparently recognizing this problem, the Secretary argues 
that the benefit to the party in interest must be more than 
"minimal, incidental, or fortuitous."  Section 406(a)(1), 
however, contains no language that even hints at such a 
requirement.  Moreover, this requirement lacks conceptual 
clarity.  The concept of a more than "minimal" benefit is 
nebulous, and although the Secretary insists that section 
406(a)(1) does not require proof of a subjective intent, the 
terms "incidental" and "fortuitous" both suggest a subjective 
element.  "Incidental" means, among other things, "occurring 
without intention or calculation."  Webster's Third New 
International Dictionary 1143 (1971).  "Fortuitous" means, among 
other things, "occurring without deliberate intention."  Id. at 
895. 
  
 We thus find strong support for a subjective intent 
requirement in the language of section 406(a)(1)(D), and finding 
no contrary evidence in the legislative history,14 we conclude 
that element four requires proof of a subjective intent to 
benefit a party in interest. 
 Precisely who must be shown to have this intent is not 
entirely clear from the statutory language.  Since the statutory 
language suggests that the transaction must be "for the benefit" 
of a party in interest, it appears that the subjective intent to 
benefit a party in interest must be harbored by one or more of 
those involved in the transaction.  In this appeal, however, we 
will not attempt to go further and specify precisely which 
persons involved in a transaction must be shown to have this 
intent. 
                     
14
.  On the contrary, we also note that the legislative history 
includes two examples of transactions that are prohibited by 
section 406(a)(1)(D) and both involve transactions whose purpose 
was to benefit a party in interest. H.R. Conf. Rep. No. 93-1280, 
93rd Cong., 2d Sess. (1974), reprinted in 1974 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5075, 
5089.   
 
     Several Department of Labor opinion letters on which the 
Secretary has relied also suggest that the "for benefit of" 
language requires proof of subjective intent.  According to the 
Secretary, "[t]he common theme in those opinions is that a 
complex transaction will violate Section 406(a)(1)(D) if it is . 
. . part of an agreement, arrangement or understanding in which a 
fiduciary caused plan assets to be used in a manner designed to 
benefit a party in interest . . . ."  Dept. of Labor 9/13/94 
Letter-Brief at 14 (emphasis added) (citing ERISA Advisory 
Opinion No. 93-33A, 1993 ERISA LEXIS 33, at *5 (Dec. 16, 1993); 
No. 89-18A, 1989 ERISA LEXIS 17, at *6 (Aug. 13, 1989); No. 85-
33A, 1985 ERISA LEXIS 11, at *9 (Oct. 1, 1985)). 
  
 Element five requires proof that the fiduciary in question 
either knew or reasonably should have known that the transaction 
constituted the use of plan assets "for the benefit" of a party 
in interest.  Thus, element five does not require proof of the 
fiduciary's subjective intent. 
 Applying this understanding of elements four and five to the 
record in the case before us, we hold that summary judgment was 
not properly granted in favor of the defendants on the basis that 
the two transactions did not violate Section 406(a)(1)(D) of 
ERISA.  Based on the record, a reasonable factfinder could 
conclude that all of those involved in the two challenged 
transactions subjectively intended to benefit Local 98.  There is 
some direct evidence of such an intent: trustee Compton stated 
that the Plan trustees refused to sue EMA to recover the balance 
of the loan because "if [they] filed suit against [EMA] [they] 
would be really filing suit against members of the union . . . ."   
JA at 467.  Furthermore, there was strong circumstantial evidence 
of an intent to benefit the Union.  A reasonable factfinder could 
easily find that the two transactions had the effect of 
benefitting the Union, and a reasonable factfinder could infer 
that the trustees intended to bring about this effect. 
 Although the district court, in denying the Secretary's 
motion for reconsideration, suggested that the Union did not 
benefit from the loan to EMA because the Union paid rent to EMA, 
we believe that a factfinder could reasonably come to a contrary 
  
conclusion.15  There was no formal lease agreement between EMA 
and Local 98, and EMA admitted that it was not trying to make any 
money from the lease.  Compton II, 834 F. Supp. at 749 n.6.  
Furthermore, Local 98 paid rent only when EMA exhausted its cash 
on hand.  Id.  Thus, the "rent" that Local 98 was charged was 
                     
15
.  The district court's apparent conclusion that Local 98 did 
not benefit from these transactions is puzzling given that it 
found the following facts to be undisputed:  
 
As of June 30, 1984, EMA owed Local 98 $230, 290.00.  
This debt consisted primarily of salary expenses that 
[the Union] paid to one or more of its employees who 
performed maintenance work at the 1719-29 Spring Garden 
Street building.  Of this amount, Local 98 charged EMA 
$17,293.00 in maintenance salary expenses during the 
year ending June 30, 1984.  The arrangement between 
Local 98 and EMA (which began prior to 1984) provided 
that EMA would not pay Local 98 the debt, which would 
be added to the intercompany payable account.  Local 98 
never demanded payment of the debt because it viewed 
transactions between itself and EMA as related party 
transactions. The reason the amount of intercompany 
payables to EMA and intercompany receivables to Local 
98 carried on the financial books "grow[s] each year is 
because the amount that's charged to salary expenses, 
just was never paid by EMA to Local 98, so it's a 
liability account that just keeps increasing each year 
because no payments are ever made, or if they are made, 
they're very minor."  Salary and other expenses by 
Local 98 for EMA continued to accumulate over the 
years.  For example, "[a]s of June 30, 1987, EMA owed 
Local 98 $316,328.00 consisting primarily of salary and 
other expenses paid by Local 98 for EMA" that had 
accumulated over the years.  During the year ending 
December 31, 1988, EMA owed Local 98 $559,918.00.  
According to EMA's accountant, the debt was forgiven by 
Local 98.  Local 98 and EMA had an established practice 
of not signing loan documents to record their financial 
transactions; Local 98's policy is to not charge EMA 
interests on advances and transfers. 
 
Compton I, 834 F. Supp. at 749 n.6. 
 
  
only the amount necessary to cover EMA's financial obligations, 
and the record is clear that Local 98 historically treated EMA's 
obligations as its own.  Local 98 consistently forwarded EMA 
money to cover salary and operating expenses during this time 
period and forgave repayment of these obligations.  Id.  Nor was  
EMA charged interest on these loans.  Id.  Indeed, as noted, 
Local 98 provided EMA with the funds necessary to purchase the 
note held by the Plan.  Id.  Thus, a reasonable factfinder could 
conclude that Local 98 benefitted from the continuation of EMA's 
long-term below market mortgage loan because that loan reduced 
EMA's cash outflow, an outflow for which the union took 
responsibility.  Likewise, a reasonable factfinder could conclude 
that Local 98 was functionally responsible for EMA's debt and 
that, Local 98 therefore benefitted from the repurchase of the 
note for less than its accounting value. 
  
 Thus, we hold that the district court should not have granted 
summary judgment in favor of the defendants on the basis that the 
two challenged transactions were not prohibited transactions 
within the meaning of section 406(a)(1)(D).  On remand, the 
district court will need to resolve the two disputed elements of 
the Secretary's section 406(a)(1)(D) claim:  whether a party to 
the transactions had the subjective intent to benefit a party in 
interest and whether any of the trustees knew of or should have 
known that the transactions were intended for the benefit of a 
party in interest. 
 
  
III.  ERISA Section 502(a)(5) Claims 
 In this section, we consider the Secretary's claims against 
the nonfiduciary defendants (EMA and Local 98) pursuant to 
section 502(a)(5) of ERISA, 29 U.S.C. § 1132(a)(5).  The 
Secretary advances two separate theories: first, that section 
502(a)(5) authorizes him to sue nonfiduciaries who knowingly 
participate in breaches of fiduciary duty by fiduciaries16 and, 
second, that section 502(a)(5) authorizes him to sue 
nonfiduciaries who participate in transactions prohibited by 
section 406(a)(1).  We reject the first theory but accept the 
latter.    
 A.  Section 502(a) of ERISA provides as follows:  
A civil action may be brought-- 
 
     (1) by a participant or beneficiary-- 
 
    (A) for the relief provided in subsection (c) 
of this section, or 
 
    (B) to recover benefits due to him under the 
terms of his plan, to enforce his rights under the 
terms of the plan, or to clarify his rights to 
future benefits under the terms of the plan; 
                     
16
.  Several ERISA provisions impose a duty on plan fiduciaries.  
As previously discussed, section 406(a)(1), 29 U.S.C. § 
1106(a)(1), prohibits fiduciaries from causing the plan to engage 
in certain prohibited transactions.  Likewise, section 406(b) of 
ERISA, 29 U.S.C. § 1106(b), prohibits self-dealing by 
fiduciaries.  Section 404(a)(1), 29 U.S.C. § 1104(a)(1), imposes 
a duty of loyalty and prudence on fiduciaries.  In addition, 
section 409 of ERISA, 29 U.S.C. § 1109, imposes liability for any 
person who breaches a fiduciary duty.  As discussed below, the 
Secretary alleges that EMA and Local 98 were knowing participants 
in the Plan trustees' breach of these duties and therefore that 
EMA and Local 98 are liable under section 502(a)(5).  Of course, 
in order to hold EMA and Local 98 liable under this theory, the 
Secretary would first need to prove a breach of duty by a 
fiduciary. 
  
 
   (2) by the Secretary, or by a participant, 
beneficiary or fiduciary for appropriate relief 
under section 1109 of this title; 
 
   (3)  by a participant, beneficiary, or fiduciary 
(A) to enjoin any act or practice which violates 
any provisions of this subchapter, or (B) to 
obtain other appropriate equitable relief (i) to 
redress such violation or (ii) to enforce any 
provision of this subchapter; 
 
     (4)  by the Secretary, or by a participant, or 
beneficiary for appropriate relief in the case of 
a violation of 1025(c) of this title; 
 
     (5)  except as otherwise provided in subsection 
(b) of this section, by the Secretary (A) to 
enjoin any act or practice which violates any 
provisions of this subchapter, or (B) to obtain 
other appropriate equitable relief (i) to redress 
such violation or (ii) to enforce any provision of 
this subchapter; or 
 
   (6) by the Secretary to collect any civil 
penalty under subsection (c)(2) or (i) or (l) of 
this section. 
 
 Although the Supreme Court has not directly discussed the 
scope of section 502(a)(5), its discussion of section 502(a)(3) 
in Mertens provides considerable guidance due to the close 
relationship between those two provisions.  In Mertens, former 
employees of the Kaiser Steel Corporation ("Kaiser") who 
participated in Kaiser's pension plan sued the plan's actuary in 
addition to the plan's trustees.  113 S. Ct. at 2065.  Claiming 
that the services provided by the actuary to the pension plan had 
been deficient and had caused the plan to be inadequately funded, 
the pensioners sought to hold the actuary liable for the "all the 
losses that their plan sustained as a result of the alleged 
breach of fiduciary duties" by the plan's trustees.  Id. at 2068.  
  
The pensioners conceded that the actuary was not a fiduciary 
within the meaning of ERISA.  Id. at 2067.  However, relying on 
section 502(a)(3) of ERISA, which allows plan participants to 
"obtain other appropriate equitable relief to redress" violations 
of ERISA, the pensioners nevertheless maintained that the actuary 
could be held liable for his "knowing participation in the breach 
of fiduciary duty by the Kaiser plan's fiduciaries."  Id.  
 Although the only issue squarely before the Supreme Court in 
Mertens was whether the remedy sought by the pensioners 
constituted "appropriate equitable relief" as opposed to money 
damages, the Court's opinion discussed the antecedent question of 
whether section 502(a)(3) creates a cause of action against 
nonfiduciaries for knowing participation in a fiduciary's breach 
of fiduciary duty.  Id. at 2067.  The Court stated:  
[N]o provision explicitly requires [nonfiduciaries] to 
avoid participation (knowing or unknowing) in a 
fiduciary's breach of fiduciary duty.  It is unlikely, 
moreover, that this was an oversight, since ERISA does 
explicitly impose "knowing participation" liability on 
cofiduciaries.  See section 405(a), 29 U.S.C. § 
1105(a).  That limitation appears all the more 
deliberate in light of the fact that "knowing 
participation" liability on the part of both cotrustees 
and third persons was well established under the common 
law of trusts.  In Russell we emphasized our 
unwillingness to infer causes of action in the ERISA 
context, since that statute's carefully crafted and 
detailed enforcement scheme provides "strong evidence 
that Congress did not intend to authorize other 
remedies that it simply forgot to incorporate 
expressly." 
 
Id. (quoting Russell, 473 U.S. at 146-47) (citations omitted) 
(emphasis in original).  Thus, the Court expressed considerable 
  
doubt that section 502(a)(3) authorizes suits against 
nonfiduciaries who participate in fiduciary breaches. 
 Relying on this discussion, EMA and Local 98 argue that the 
Secretary cannot proceed against them on the theory that they 
knowingly participated in a fiduciary's breach.  On the other 
hand, the Secretary urges that we disregard Mertens' discussion 
of this issue as "mere dicta."  The Secretary contends that the 
language of section 502(a)(5) does not require that the ERISA 
violation be committed by the person against whom relief is 
sought.  Rather, the Secretary argues that he may maintain a 
cause of action under section 502(a)(5) so long as the relief 
sought is "appropriate" for the purpose of "redressing" a 
violation.  Thus, the Secretary asserts that he does not have to 
show that EMA and Local 98 actually violated any ERISA provision, 
but only that they were "knowing participants" in a fiduciary's 
violation and that the relief sought is appropriate for 
redressing that violation.  The Secretary further contends that 
any ambiguity should be resolved in his favor since pre-Mertens 
case law generally recognized ERISA claims against nonfiduciaries 
who participated in a fiduciary's breach.17  In the event that we 
                     
17
.  See Diduck v. Kaszycki & Sons Contractors, Inc., 974 F.2d 
270, 279-81 (2d Cir. 1992); Whitfield v. Lindermann, 853 F.2d 
1298, 1302-03 (5th Cir. 1988), cert. denied, 450 U.S. 1089 
(1989); Brock v. Hendershott, 840 F.2d 339, 342 (6th Cir. 1982); 
Thornton v. Evans, 692 F.2d 1064, 1078 (7th Cir. 1982); Fink v. 
National Sav. and Trust Co., 772 F.2d 951, 958 (D.C.Cir. 1985) 
(dicta).  Cf.  Mertens v. Hewitt Assocs., 948 F.2d 607, 611 (9th 
Cir. 1991), aff'd on other grounds, 113 S. Ct. 2063 (1993) 
(rejecting "knowing participation" liability); Useden v. Acker, 
947 F.2d 1563, 1581 (11th Cir.), cert. denied, 113 S. Ct. 2927 
(1993) (same). 
  
do not interpret the language of section 502(a)(5) as creating 
such a cause of action against nonfiduciaries, the Secretary 
urges us to recognize such a cause of action by utilizing our 
authority to develop federal common law.  The Secretary points 
out that the Supreme Court has authorized the federal courts to 
develop federal common law under ERISA by drawing on the 
traditional law of trusts, see Firestone Tire and Rubber Co. v. 
Bruch, 489 U.S. 101, 110 (1984), and the Secretary notes that the 
common law of trusts imposes liability on nonfiduciaries who 
knowingly participate in a fiduciary's breach of duty, see 3 
Austin W. Scott & William F. Fratcher, Law of Trusts § 224.1, at 
404 (4th ed. 1988). 
 The Secretary's argument has been rejected by the courts of 
appeals that have addressed it after Mertens.  In Reich v. Rowe, 
20 F.3d 25 (1st Cir. 1994), the Secretary sued several corporate 
defendants involved in the failed OMNI Medical Health and Welfare 
Trust.  Id. at 26.  OMNI provided group medical, dental, and life 
insurance to business employers in Massachusetts.  Id.  The 
Secretary contended that OMNI's fiduciaries breached their duties 
and that OMNI's financial consultants "knowingly participated" in 
this breach.  Id. at 26-27.  The district court dismissed the 
Secretary's claim against the financial consultants under Fed. R. 
Civ. P. 12(b)(6), id. at 28, and the First Circuit affirmed, id. 
at 35. 
 Despite the Secretary's urgings, the Rowe court found the 
Supreme Court's Mertens dicta to be persuasive.  Id. at 30-31.  
Interpreting section 502(a)(5) "to authorize actions only against 
  
those who commit violations of ERISA or who are engaged in an 
`act or practice' proscribed by the statute," id. at 29, the Rowe 
court concluded that this provision does not apply to a 
nonfiduciary's participation in a fiduciary breach because such 
participation "is not an `act or practice' which violates ERISA,"  
id. at 30.  The court further rejected the Secretary's argument 
that it should apply the court's broad equitable power and the 
court's federal common law-making authority under ERISA to read 
section 502(a)(5) expansively to reach such conduct.  The court 
noted that "Congress had enacted a comprehensive legislative 
scheme including an integrated system of procedures for 
enforcement," id. at 31-32 (quoting Russell, 473 U.S. at 147), 
and that it could have easily provided for a claim based on 
knowing participation in a fiduciary breach, id. at 31.  The 
court wrote: 
 All things considered, judicial remedies for 
nonfiduciary participation in a fiduciary breach fall 
within the line of cases where Congress deliberately 
omitted a potential cause of action rather than the 
cases where Congress has invited the courts to engage 
in interstitial lawmaking. 
 
Id. at 31.  Thus, the court concluded that the Secretary could 
not sue "a professional service provider [that] assist[ed] in a 
fiduciary breach but receive[d] no ill-gotten plan assets . . . 
."  Id. at 35.  
 Similarly, in Reich v. Continental Casualty Co., 33 F.3d 754, 
757 (7th Cir. 1994), cert. denied, 115 S. Ct. 1104 (1995), the 
Seventh Circuit rejected the Secretary's argument that a 
nonfiduciary may be held liable for knowingly participating in a 
  
fiduciary breach.  The court followed the Mertens dicta, stating 
that when the Supreme Court's view of an issue is embodied in  
a recent dictum that considers all the relevant 
considerations and adumbrates an unmistakable 
conclusion, it would be reckless to think the Court 
likely to adopt a contrary view in the near future.  In 
such a case the dictum provides the best, though not an 
infallible, guide to what the law is, and it will 
ordinarily be the duty of a lower court to be guided by 
it. 
 
Id.18 
 In light of the Supreme Court's discussion in Mertens and 
subsequent decisions of the First and Seventh Circuits, we reject 
the Secretary's argument that he may sue a nonfiduciary under 
section 502(a)(5) for knowingly participating in a fiduciary 
breach.  Contrary to the Secretary's urging, we are not prepared 
to disregard the Supreme Court's discussion of this issue in 
Mertens.  Moreover, we see little significance in the fact that 
the Supreme Court in Mertens was discussing section 502(a)(3) as 
opposed section 502(a)(5).  As the Court noted in Mertens, the 
                     
18
.  Buckley Dement, Inc. v. Travellers Plan Administrators of 
Illinois, Inc., 39 F.3d 784 (7th Cir. 1994) is also instructive.  
There, the sponsor of a health care plan who was also its 
administrator and fiduciary sued a third-party claims 
administrator.  Id. at 785-86.  The sponsor argued that the 
administrator caused the plan to incur huge losses by failing to 
process a participant's medical claims before the plan's excess 
health insurance coverage policy lapsed.  Id.  Because the 
administrator was not a fiduciary, the sponsor asked the court to 
infer a federal common-law right to relief under ERISA.  Id. at 
789.  Relying on Mertens' dicta, the court declined to do so, 
holding that it was "without authority to entertain a claim for 
relief against a nonfiduciary based on [the] fashioning of a 
federal common-law remedy."  Id. at 790.  Accord, Colleton 
Regional Hosp. v. MPS Medical Review Sys., Inc., 866 F. Supp. 896 
(D.S.C. 1994).   
  
language shared by both provisions "should be deemed to have the 
same meaning," 113 S. Ct. at 2070, and we therefore believe that 
the analysis of the one provision should apply equally to the 
other with respect to the question at issue.  We therefore hold 
that section 502(a)(5) does not authorize suits by the Secretary 
against nonfiduciaries charged solely with participating in a 
fiduciary breach.19 
                     
19
.  The Secretary makes the additional argument that section 
502(l) of ERISA, 29 U.S.C. § 1132(l), indicates that Congress 
intended for section 502(a)(5) to provide a remedy against 
nonfiduciaries who participate in a fiduciary breach.  Section 
502(l) provides in relevant part: 
 
(1) in the case of-- 
 
   (A) any breach of fiduciary responsibility under 
(or other violation of) part 4 by a fiduciary , or 
 
   (B) any knowing participation in such a breach 
or violation by any other persons,  
 
the Secretary shall assess a civil penalty against such 
a fiduciary or other person in an amount equal to 20 
percent of the applicable recovery amount . . . .  
 
The Secretary contends that unless section 502(a)(5) provides a 
remedy for nonfiduciary violations of a fiduciary breach, the 
term "other persons" in section 502(l) would be rendered a 
nullity.  We disagree. 
 
 A similar contention was advanced in Mertens.  There, 
it was argued that section 502(l) demonstrated Congress intended 
to authorize the recovery of money damages for nonfiduciary 
participation in a fiduciary breach.  The Supreme Court, however, 
rejected this argument, explaining: 
 
[T]he "equitable relief" awardable under section 
502(a)(5) includes restitution of ill-gotten plan 
assets or profits, providing an "applicable recovery 
amount' to use to calculate the penalty, . . . and even 
assuming nonfiduciaries are not liable at all for 
knowing participation in a fiduciary's breach of duty, 
see supra, at 2067-2068, cofiduciaries expressly are, 
  
 B.  We now turn to the Secretary's argument that section 
502(a)(5) authorizes him to sue a nonfiduciary who participates 
in a transaction prohibited by section 406(a)(1).  In response to 
this argument, EMA and Local 98 seem to suggest that the 
Secretary cannot obtain relief from them even if the transactions 
at issue are found to be prohibited under section 406(a)(1) of 
ERISA.20  Section 406(a)(1) provides that "[a] fiduciary with 
(..continued) 
see section 405, so there are some "other person[s]" 
than fiduciaries-in-breach liable under section 
502(l)(1)(B). 
 
113 S. Ct. at 2071. 
 
 We also agree with the discussion of this argument in 
Rowe.  The Rowe court noted that Secretary was relying on a 
provision that provides civil penalties in order to infer a cause 
of action from a provision that only provides equitable relief.  
20 F.3d at 34.  Thus, the court explained: 
 
[I]t is difficult to imagine any case where knowing 
participation in a fiduciary breach by a nonfiduciary 
would occasion the type of remedy (restitution awards) 
that would trigger [section 502(l)(1)(B)] without the 
nonfiduciary having engaged in a prohibited transaction 
under [section 406] or otherwise having obtained some 
ill-gotten plan assets in a manner not covered by the 
prohibited transaction section.  We conclude, 
therefore, that [section 502(l)] makes little sense as 
independently authorizing equitable relief against 
nonfiduciaries . . . who allegedly participated in a 
fiduciary breach but did not engage in an act 
prohibited by the statute or otherwise obtain plan 
assets, when it can never be used for such relief. 
 
Id. at 34-35 (footnote omitted).  
20
.  This argument is not available to the Plan trustees as they 
are all fiduciaries within the meaning of ERISA.  As noted, ERISA 
imposes a number of substantive duties on plan fiduciaries, see 
supra note 16, and sections 502(a)(3) and (5) of ERISA, 29 U.S.C. 
§§ 1132(a)(3) and (5), clearly authorize the Secretary to obtain 
relief against fiduciaries who have breached their duties.  Thus, 
the Secretary can sue any fiduciary who breached its duty because 
  
respect to a plan shall not cause the plan to engage in a 
[prohibited] transaction . . . ."  29 U.S.C. § 1106(a)(1) 
(emphasis added).  Since this language appears on its face to 
apply only to fiduciaries and not to other parties who 
participate in prohibited transactions, EMA and Local 98 maintain 
that the Secretary is attempting to make them liable for a 
fiduciary's breach of duty and that such a theory was rejected in 
Mertens. 
 While this argument is not without force, we are ultimately 
persuaded that it is based on an unduly narrow interpretation of 
sections 406(a)(1) and 502 (a)(5).  First, we note that Mertens 
itself seemed to imply that section 406(a) imposes duties on 
nonfiduciaries who participate in prohibited transactions.  After 
observing that "ERISA contains various provisions that can be 
read as imposing obligations upon nonfiduciaries," 113 S. Ct. at 
2067, the Court cited section 406(a), 29 U.S.C. § 1106(a), as an 
example and stated that this provision prohibits a nonfiduciary 
party in interest from "offer[ing] his services" to a plan or 
"engag[ing] in certain other transactions with the plan," id. at 
2067 n.4. 
 Second, the legislative history of ERISA appears to 
contradict the position advocated by EMA and Local 98.  The 
Senate Report stated: 
The bill also makes a party in interest who 
participates in a prohibited transaction . . . 
personally liable for any losses sustained by the plan 
(..continued) 
of its participation in a prohibited transaction (or who breached 
any other duty). 
  
and for any profits made through using plan assets. . . 
.  This liability is appropriate because in these 
situations often the party in interest is a major 
beneficiary of a fiduciary breach . . . . 
 
S. Rep. No. 93-383, 93rd Cong., 2d Sess. (1974), reprinted  
 
in 1974 U.S.C.A.A.N. 4890, 4989. 
 
 Third, EMA's and Local 98's position is inconsistent with the 
analysis of two other courts of appeals.  In Rowe, the First 
Circuit, while refusing to accept the argument that the Secretary 
could sue a nonfiduciary under section 502(a)(5) for knowingly 
participating in a frivolous breach, suggested that the Secretary 
could maintain a suit under that provision against a party in 
interest who participated in a transaction prohibited under 
section 406(a)(1).  The court observed: 
Congress proscribed several "acts or practices" in 
ERISA's substantive provisions that involve 
nonfiduciaries . . . .  See Mertens, ____ U.S. at ____ 
& n.4, 113 S. Ct. at 2067 & n.4.  For example, 29 
U.S.C. § 1106(a)(1) prohibits certain transactions 
between "parties in interest," see supra, note 2, and 
ERISA plans . . . . 
 
20 F.3d at 31 (footnote omitted).  The court then added: 
 
The fact that [section 406] imposes the duty to refrain 
from prohibited transactions on fiduciaries and not on 
the parties in interest is irrelevant for our purposes 
because [section 502(a)(5)] reaches "acts or practices" 
that violate ERISA and prohibited transactions violate 
[section 406].  Although fiduciary breaches also 
violate ERISA, nonfiduciaries cannot, by definition, 
engage in the act or practice breaching a fiduciary 
duty.  Nonfiduciaries can, however, engage in the act 
or practice of transacting with an ERISA plan. 
 
Id. at 31, n.7. 
 
  
 Similarly, in Nieto v. Ecker, 845 F.2d 868 (9th Cir. 1988), 
the court held that a suit seeking appropriate equitable relief 
could be brought under section 502(a)(3)21 against a party in 
interest who had participated in a transaction prohibited under 
section 406(a).  The court explained:     
 It is true that section 406(a) only prohibits 
certain transactions by fiduciaries, and does not 
expressly bar parties in interest from engaging in 
these transactions.  However, section 502(a)(3)'s 
language expressly grants equitable power to redress 
violations of ERISA; prohibited transactions plainly 
fall within this category.  Courts may find it 
difficult or impossible to undo such illegal 
transactions unless they have jurisdiction over all 
parties who allegedly participated in them.  In 
contrast to section 409(a), section 502(a)(3) is not 
limited to fiduciaries, and there is no reason to 
exempt parties in interest from this remedial provision 
when the engage in transactions prohibited by [ERISA]. 
 
Id. at 873-74.22 
                     
21
.  Nieto involved the construction of section 502(a)(3).  
However, as explained above, see supra page 34, we see no reason 
to distinguish between section 502(a)(3) and 502(a)(5) on this 
issue. 
22
.  In light of this analysis, EMA's and Local 98's reliance on 
Brock v. Citizens Bank of Clovis, 841 F.2d 344 (10th Cir.), cert. 
denied, 488 U.S. 829 (1988), is misplaced.  In Citizens Bank, the 
Secretary brought a suit against an ERISA trustee for violating 
section 406(a)(1).  841 F.2d at 345-46.  The ERISA trustee, a 
bank, had loaned plan funds to individuals who had used the money 
to pay off interim financing that they had received from the 
bank.  Id.  The Secretary did not allege that this transaction 
violated a specific provision of ERISA but argued that ERISA 
demanded "a strict prohibition of any dealing in which doubt may 
be cast upon the loyalty of the fiduciary."  Id. at 347.  Because 
the Secretary was unable to allege the violation of a specific 
provision of ERISA, the Tenth Circuit upheld the dismissal of his 
claim.  Id.  The present case, however, is clearly 
distinguishable because here the Secretary has alleged that EMA 
and Local 98 violated a specific substantive provision of ERISA, 
section 406(a)(1), that regulates the conduct of nonfiduciaries. 
  
 Fourth, we agree with the Secretary that the parallel tax 
provisions support his position that nonfiduciaries may be held 
liable for their participation in prohibited transactions.  
Section 4975 of the Internal Revenue Code, 26 U.S.C. § 4975, 
imposes taxes on certain persons who participate in prohibited 
transactions.  Section 4975(h) provides that the Secretary of 
Treasury is required to notify the Secretary of Labor before 
sending a notice of deficiency with respect to such taxes in 
order to give the latter a "reasonable opportunity to obtain a 
correction of the prohibited transaction . . . ."  Since 
"correction of the prohibited transaction" implies an order of 
restitution directed to the party who participated in the 
transaction with the plan, this provision buttresses the 
Secretary's position.  For all of these reasons, we hold that the 
Secretary can bring an action under section 502(a)(5) against a 
nonfiduciary who participates in a transaction prohibited by 
section 406(a).23  
                     
23
.  Contrary to EMA's suggestions, this holding is not 
foreclosed by footnote six of our opinion in Painters of 
Philadelphia Council No. 32 Welfare Fund v. Price Waterhouse, 879 
F.2d 1146 (3d Cir. 1989).  In that case, a plan and its trustees 
sued the plan's former auditor under section 502(a)(3) of ERISA, 
claiming that the auditor breached its fiduciary duties by 
failing to advise the trustees about improprieties allegedly 
committed by the plan's administrator, and that the auditor was 
therefore liable for the resulting losses under section 409 of 
ERISA, 29 U.S.C. § 1109, which makes a fiduciary liable for the 
losses caused by a fiduciary breach.  Id. at 1148-49.  We upheld 
the dismissal of these claims.  Id. at 1151.  After explaining 
that the auditor was not a fiduciary under ERISA, we responded in 
footnote six to the plaintiffs' suggestion that they could sue 
the auditor under section 502(a)(3) even if it was not a 
fiduciary.  We noted the plaintiff's reliance on Justice 
Brennan's concurrence in Russell, where it was suggested that the 
  
 Finally, we disagree with EMA's contention that even if 
section 406(a)(1) regulates the behavior of some nonfiduciaries, 
it does not reach nonfiduciaries that are not parties in 
interest.  As we previously explained, see supra pages 19 to 27, 
section 406(a)(1)(D) applies to transactions between a plan and a 
third party when the transaction is "for the benefit of a party 
in interest."  Section 406(a)(1)(D) therefore extends the scope 
of liability under ERISA beyond fiduciaries and parties in 
interest.  Because section 502(a)(5) authorizes the Secretary to 
obtain relief against any party that participates in a 
transaction that violates section 406(a)(1), EMA can be held 
liable for its role in the allegedly prohibited transaction.    
 We will, however, uphold the district court's award of 
summary judgment in favor of EMA and Local 98 as to the first, 
but not the second, transaction.  The liability of EMA and Local 
98 as to the first transaction is predicated on the Plan 
trustees' holding of the note past the expiration of the 
grandfather period.  We know of no way, and the Secretary has not 
suggested one, that EMA and Local 98 could have forced the Plan 
(..continued) 
phrase "other appropriate equitable relief" in section 502(a)(3) 
might be read to incorporate principles of trust law under which 
a beneficiary might obtain extracontractual damages based on a 
fiduciary breach.  See 473 U.S. at 150, 157-58.  We then wrote:  
"Since we have held that [the auditor] is not a fiduciary under 
ERISA, however, it cannot be held liable on a trust-law theory."  
879 F.2d at 151 n.6.  Although EMA construes this statement to 
mean flatly that "a . . . section 502(a)(3) action for equitable 
relief against nonfiduciaries cannot be maintained," EMA Br. at 
21, we interpret this statement to mean only that principles of 
trust law permitting the recovery of extracontractual damages 
from a fiduciary who breaches his or her duties provide no basis 
for recovery from a nonfiduciary. 
  
to divest itself of the note in a timely fashion.  We also note 
that ERISA had not been enacted at the time of the first 
transaction.  Thus, we conclude that EMA and Local 98 did not 
engage in an "act or practice" prohibited by ERISA and therefore 
they cannot be held liable by the Secretary pursuant to section 
502(a)(5).  On the other hand, EMA and Local 98 were clearly 
active parties in the second transaction and therefore the 
Secretary has a cause of action against them on this transaction. 
  In sum, we hold that a nonfiduciary that is a party to a 
transaction prohibited by section 406(a)(1) engages in an "act or 
practice" that violates ERISA.  We furthermore hold that the 
Secretary, pursuant to section 502(a)(5), may sue to enjoin this 
act or practice or "to obtain other appropriate equitable relief 
to redress such a violation."  On remand, therefore, the 
Secretary may maintain his section 406(a)(1)(D) claims against 
EMA and Local 98 as to the second transaction.24  We uphold the 
district court's award of summary judgment as to the first 
transaction because neither EMA nor Local 98 controlled the 
decision to hold the note past the grandfather period and 
therefore they did not engage in an action or practice that 
violated ERISA. 
   
 IV.  Section 406(b)(2) Claim 
                     
24
.  The defendants also claim that the Secretary is not entitled 
to the relief sought for the alleged violations of section 
406(a)(1)(D) because it is not "appropriate equitable relief."  
This issue was not presented to or decided by the district court, 
and we decline to address it now.   
  
 We next address whether the district court erred in ruling 
that the union trustees, Compton, McHugh and Nielsen, did not 
violate section 406(b)(2) of ERISA, 21 U.S.C. § 1106(b)(2).25  
The Secretary argues that these trustees violated section 
406(b)(2) because, in connection with the sale of the note to 
EMA, they "participated actively in the decisionmaking process 
regarding the disposition of the mortgage loan on behalf of both 
the lender, the plan, and the borrowers, EMA and Local 98."  
Dept. of Labor Br. at 40.  We hold that the district court erred 
in granting summary judgment against the Secretary with respect 
to this claim.   
 Section 406(b) prohibits a plan fiduciary from engaging in 
various forms of self-dealing.  Its purpose is to "prevent[] a 
fiduciary from being put in a position where he has dual 
loyalties and, therefore, he cannot act exclusively for the 
benefit of a plan's participants and beneficiaries."  H.R. Conf. 
Rep. No. 93-1280, 93rd Cong., 2d Sess. (1974), reprinted in 1974 
U.S.C.C.A.N. 5038, 5089.   
 Section 406(b)(2) provides in pertinent part: 
A fiduciary with respect to a plan shall not-- . . . 
 
   (2) in his individual or any other capacity act 
in any transaction involving the plan on behalf of 
a party (or represent a party) whose interests are 
adverse to the interests of the plan or the 
interests of its participants or beneficiaries . . 
. . 
 
                     
25
.  Before the district court, the Secretary also argued that 
the union trustees violated section 406(b)(1).  The Secretary has 
abandoned this claim. 
  
This provision is a blanket prohibition against a fiduciary's 
"act[ing] on behalf of" or "represent[ing]" a party with 
interests "adverse to the interests of the plan" in relation to a 
transaction with the plan.  Thus, this provision, like the 
prohibited transaction provisions of section 406(a)(1), applies 
regardless of whether the transaction is "fair" to the plan. 
 In Cutaiar v. Marshall, 590 F.2d 523 (3d Cir. 1979), we 
addressed the scope of section 406(b)(2).  In that case, an 
identical group of trustees managed a union pension fund and a 
union welfare fund.  Id. at 525.  Because of decreased employer 
contributions, the welfare fund began to run short of cash, and 
the trustees agreed to loan money from the pension fund to the 
welfare fund.  Id.  Despite the fact that the transaction 
involved no allegations of misconduct or unfair terms, we held 
that section 406(b)(2) had been violated.  We first wrote: 
When identical trustees of two employee benefit plans 
whose participants and beneficiaries are not identical 
effect a loan between the plans without a § 408 
exemption, a per se violation of ERISA exists. 
 
590 F.2d at 529.  See also Lowen v. Tower Asset Management, Inc., 
829 F.2d 1209, 1213 (2d Cir. 1987) (noting that section 406(b) 
needs to be "broadly construed" and that liability may be imposed 
"even where there is `no taint of scandal, hint of self-dealing, 
no trace of bad faith'") (citations omitted); Donovan v. Mazzola, 
716 F.2d 1226, 1238 (9th Cir. 1983), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 1040 
(1984) (noting that per se prohibition of section 406(b) is the 
consistent with the remedial purpose of ERISA, for "at the heart 
of the fiduciary relationship is the duty of complete and 
  
undivided loyalty to the beneficiaries of the trust") (citations 
omitted).  We then added: 
 We have no doubt that the pension fund's loan to 
the welfare fund falls within the prohibition of 
section 406(b)(2).  Fiduciaries acting on both sides of 
a loan transaction cannot negotiate the best terms for 
either plan.  By balancing the interests of each plan, 
they may be able to construct terms which are fair and 
equitable for both plans; if so, they may qualify for a 
section 408 exemption.  But without the formal 
procedures required under section 408, each plan 
deserves more than a balancing of interests.  Each plan 
must be represented by trustees who are free to exert 
the maximum economic power manifested by their fund 
whenever they are negotiating a commercial transaction.  
Section 406(b)(2) speaks of "the interests of the plan 
or the interests of its participants or beneficiaries."  
It does not speak of "some" or "many" or "most" of the 
participants.  If there is a single member who 
participates in only one of the plans, his plan must be 
administered without regard for the interests of any 
other plan. 
 
Id. at 530. 
 We interpret Cutaiar as follows.  Each defendant, in his 
capacity as a pension fund trustee, violated section 406(b)(2) 
because, in connection with the loan from the pension fund to the 
welfare fund, he acted on behalf of and represented the welfare 
fund, a party with interests that were adverse to those of the 
pension fund as far as that transaction was concerned.  
Similarly, each defendant, in his capacity as a welfare fund 
trustee, violated section 406(b)(2) because, in connection with 
that loan, he acted on behalf of and represented the pension 
fund.   
  
 The district court in this case, however, read Cutaiar 
narrowly and, indeed, essentially limited the decision to its 
facts.  The district court stated: 
The Secretary's reliance on Cutaiar is misplaced.  As 
noted by the Tenth Circuit in Brock [v. Citizens Bank 
of Clovis, 841 F.2d 344, 347 n.2 (10th Cir. 1988), 
cert. denied, 488 U.S. 829 (1988),] Cutaiar did not 
involve a transaction with a third party.  Moreover, 
the boards of the Plan and EMA were not identical and 
Compton, McHugh and Nielsen did not constitute a 
majority of EMA's Board . . . .  Likewise, the 
purported "conflict of interest" violation of section 
406(b)(2) is sheer hypotheses unsupported by any 
evidence that these three defendants--who did not 
control the board of EMA--acted on behalf of EMA, the 
adverse party to the Plan in the sale of the note. 
 
Compton II, 834 F.Supp. at 757.  We do not agree with this 
interpretation of Cutaiar. 
 Although the district court was correct in noting that the 
trustees on both sides of the challenged transaction in Cutaiar 
were identical, Cutaiar did not hold that section 406(b)(2) can 
be violated only when there are identical decisionmakers on both 
sides of the transaction.  This would be contrary to the plain 
language of the provision.  Section 406(b)(2) creates a duty 
against self-dealing for each individual fiduciary, not just 
fiduciaries as a group.  Each fiduciary is prohibited from 
"act[ing] on behalf of an [adverse] party (or represent[ing]) an 
[adverse] party . . . ."  Thus, a plan fiduciary may act on 
behalf of or represent an adverse party even if the groups 
controlling the plan and the adverse party are not identical.  
See Davidson v. Cook, 567 F.Supp. 225, 237 (E.D.Va. 1983) aff'd 
734 F.2d 10 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 899 (1984) 
  
(finding a violation of § 406(b)(2) when trustees of pension fund 
loaned money to corporation with close ties to the union 
sponsoring the plan despite fact that boards of two groups were 
not identical).   
 Likewise, the fact that Cutaiar did not, in the district 
court's words, involve a transaction with "a third party," 834 F. 
Supp. at 757, does not serve to distinguish this case.  We 
understand the district court as opining that Cutaiar is 
inapposite because it involved a transaction between a fiduciary 
and a "party in interest," whereas the transaction at issue here 
was between a fiduciary and an entity other than a party in 
interest.  This was the distinction drawn by the Tenth Circuit in 
Citizens Bank of Clovis, 841 F.2d at 347 n.2, on which the 
district court relied.  See 834 F. Supp. at 757.  However, we 
believe that this reading of Cutaiar is erroneous.  First, we see 
no support for this interpretation in the Cutaiar opinion.  That 
opinion never referred to either fund as a "party in interest."  
Nor did it mention the provision of ERISA that defines a party in 
interest, section 3(14), 29 U.S.C. § 1002(14), or the provision 
that prohibits transactions with a party in interest, section 
406(a)(1), 29 U.S.C. § 1106(a)(1).26  Second, it seems clear from 
the language of section 406(b)(2) that its prohibition is not 
restricted to conduct related to "parties in interest."  Rather, 
                     
26
.  Indeed, as the Secretary notes, Dept. of Labor Br. at 43 & 
n.22, it does not appear that the related plan in Cutaiar fell 
within the definition of a party in interest in section 3(14) of 
ERISA, 29 U.S.C. § 1002(14). 
  
section 406(b)(2) speaks more broadly of parties "whose interests 
are adverse to the interests of the plan or the interests of its 
participants or beneficiaries."  A party clearly may have 
interests that are adverse to those of a plan or its participants 
or beneficiaries in relation to a particular transaction without 
being a "party in interest" as defined by section 3(14).   
 Cutaiar is significant for present purposes chiefly because 
it stands for the proposition that, when a plan loans money to or 
borrows money from another party, the plan and the other party 
will have adverse interests within the meaning of section 
406(b)(2).  See 570 F.2d at 529.  It follows, therefore, that in 
the present case the Plan and EMA had adverse interests with 
respect to the sale of EMA's note.  Furthermore, it seems 
abundantly clear that the interests of the Plan and Local 98 were 
also adverse with respect to this transaction.27 
                     
27
.  This is shown clearly by the actions taken by Local 98 in 
connection with the purchase of EMA's note.  See generally 
Compton I, 834 F. Supp. at 751 n.7.  Because EMA had no money of 
its own, it was unable to proceed with the transaction until 
Local 98 approved.  JA at 96, 471. Indeed, the record indicates 
that the Plan trustees considered Local 98 to be the actual 
purchaser of the note given the fact that EMA had no funds of its 
own.  Since Local 98 advanced the funds to EMA necessary to 
purchase the note, the union's approval was a prerequisite to 
completing the transaction.  Id. at 58-59, 89, 448, 471.  In 
explaining the sale of the note, Compton also revealed that Local 
98 was the effective purchaser: "The trustees felt that would be 
a prudent move and had to find a buyer for the market value, and 
that's when the union stepped in and decided they would purchase 
the mortgage and get rid of it at the market value."  Id. at 471 
(emphasis added).  Thus, as the "real" purchaser of the note, 
Local 98 necessarily had interests adverse to the Plan in 
relation to that transaction.  See Cutaiar, 590 F.2d at 529. 
  
 Since the interests of the Plan were adverse to those of EMA 
and Local 98 with respect to the transaction at issue, the only 
remaining question under section 406(b)(2) is whether the union 
trustees acted on behalf of or represented EMA or Local 98 in 
connection with that transaction.  The record strongly suggests 
that they did.  All three union trustees were officials of Local 
98, and Compton was also an officer of EMA.  Moreover, the union 
trustees apparently did not recuse themselves when the 
transaction was being considered by EMA and Local 98.  Instead, 
they participated in discussion of the mortgage transaction at 
board meetings of EMA and Local 98.  Rec. 38 at 23; JA at 417-27, 
446.  While these facts in themselves may be sufficient to 
support summary judgment in favor of the Secretary on his section 
406(b)(2) claim, we will leave that determination for the 
district court to make in the first instance.28  On remand, the 
district court should determine whether, during EMA's and Local 
98's deliberations concerning the purchase of EMA's note, the 
union trustees took any action in their capacities as union or 
EMA officers.  If they did, then they took actions in this 
transaction on behalf of EMA and/or Local 98, parties with 
interests adverse to the Plan, and they therefore violated 
section 406(b)(2).29 
                     
28
.  We recognize that the evidence against Compton, who was 
president of EMA and Local 98, is stronger than against the other 
two union trustees.  We are sure that on remand the district 
court will scrutinize this aspect on the record. 
29
.  The Secretary also suggests that the union trustees violated 
section 406(b)(2) because, while acting in their capacities as 
plan trustees during the consideration of the sale of EMA's note, 
  
 
V.  Section 404(a)(1) Claims  
 We come, finally, to the Secretary's claims that the Plan 
trustees violated ERISA's loyalty and prudence requirements, 
sections 404(a)(1)(A) and (B) of ERISA, 29 U.S.C. §§ 404(a)(1)(A) 
and (B), and that Fidelity violated ERISA's requirement that 
fiduciaries act in accordance with plan documents, section 
404(a)(1)(D) of ERISA, 29 U.S.C. § 404(a)(1)(D).  The district 
court did not specifically address these claims in either of its 
two opinions, but it did enter judgment against all defendants on 
"all claims against them."  Compton I, 834 F. Supp. at 751.  We 
agree with the Secretary that this disposition was erroneous.   
 In  addition to making certain actions by fiduciaries illegal 
per se, ERISA also codified common law duties of loyalty and 
prudence for ERISA trustees.  In relevant part, section 404(a) 
provides as follows: 
(a) Prudent man standard of care 
 
     (1) [A] fiduciary shall discharge his duties 
with respect to a plan solely in the interest of 
the participants and beneficiaries and-- 
 
    (A) for the exclusive purpose of: 
 
(..continued) 
they were actually serving the interests of EMA or Local 98.  
This theory, although based on section 406(b)(2), seems to 
resemble the Secretary's claim against all of the trustees under 
section 404(a)(1)(A), which is discussed below.  However, the 
Secretary has not provided a precise description of this theory 
as distinct from the section 406(b)(2) theory discussed in text.  
For this reason, and because it may not be necessary for the 
district court to reach this theory on remand, we do not address 
the validity or contours of such a theory at this time. 
  
       (i) providing benefits to participants 
and their beneficiaries; and 
 
      (ii) defraying reasonable expenses of 
administering the plan; 
 
      (B) with the care, skill, prudence, and 
diligence under the circumstances then 
prevailing that a prudent man acting in a 
like capacity and familiar with such matters 
would use in the conduct of an enterprise of 
a like character and with like aims; . . . 
 
      (D) in accordance with the documents and 
instruments governing the plan . . . . 
 
 Based on the summary judgment record, a reasonable factfinder 
could conclude that the fiduciaries violated their duties.  The 
evidence discussed above with regards to self-dealing also 
supports the Secretary's argument that the trustees may have 
violated the duty of loyalty set out in section 404(a)(1)(A).  As 
noted, the Plan trustees sold the note for well below its 
accounting value, and the record shows that the union trustees 
were active on both sides of the negotiations.  JA at 54, 58-59, 
82, 89, 91, 95-96, 106.  Furthermore, the Plan trustees 
apparently did not sue EMA to force a purchase of the mortgage at 
its accounting value because that would have effectively been a 
suit against Local 98.  Id. at 467.  We agree with the Second 
Circuit that trustees violate their duty of loyalty when they act 
in the interests of the plan sponsor rather than "with an eye 
single to the interests of the participants and beneficiaries of 
the plan."  Donovan, 680 F.2d at 271. 
 Likewise, the Secretary has adduced evidence suggesting that 
the Plan trustees may not have acted in a prudent manner and may 
  
thus have violated section 404(a)(1)(B).  The Plan trustees were 
aware that their counsel and the Secretary considered the loan to 
violate ERISA.  JA at 69, 87.  Despite counsel's advice to sell 
the loan for its accounting value, the Plan trustees did not do 
so.  Furthermore, the Plan trustees appear not to have made any 
effort to dispose of the mortgage until two months before the end 
of ERISA's ten-year transition period.  The evidence indicates 
that Fidelity participated in these transactions, and this 
evidence is sufficient to support a finding that it violated 
section 404(a)(1)(D) by failing to exercise the authority vested 
in it by the Plan, which included control over Plan 
investments.30  Although not necessarily dispositive, these facts 
certainly provide a sufficient basis for the Secretary's claims 
to survive a motion for summary judgment.31 
 We therefore reverse the order of the district court insofar 
as it granted summary judgment against the Secretary on these 
claims and we remand for further proceedings regarding them.  
 
                     
30
.  As noted, an Amendment to the Agreement of Trust between 
Local 98 and Fidelity provides that Fidelity "shall have 
exclusive authority and discretion in investment of the Fund, and 
to so invest without distinction between principal and income."  
JA at 342. 
31
.  The Plan trustees argue that there was no violation of the 
duty of loyalty and prudence because the trustees had no superior 
alternative to the one they chose.  Although there is evidence to 
support this view, the Secretary has adduced sufficient facts to 
make the district court's resolution of this issue by summary 
judgment improper. 
 
      
  
VI. Conclusion    
 The district court's order entering summary judgment in favor 
of all defendants on all claims is reversed in part and affirmed 
in part.  Given the complex nature of the transactions at issue 
here, we intimate no view as to the extent of the liability, if 
any, that should be imposed on a defendant that is ultimately 
found to have violated ERISA.   We remand to the district court 
for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.  
 
